NOVEMBER 2026

CEASEFIRE IN NAME, DEPRIVATION IN PRACTICE

One Year of Gaza's Failed Peace Plan



Introduction

This scorecard evaluates the implementation of the ceasefire agreement outlined in the Trump administration's 20-point Comprehensive Plan to End the Gaza Conflict, as endorsed by UN Security Council Resolution 2803 (2025). It assesses progress against the plan's stated objectives on civilian protection, humanitarian access, reconstruction and economic development, and freedom of movement.

The negotiators of the ceasefire presented it not only as a way to stop the fighting, but as the foundation for a fundamentally better reality in Gaza, one that would deliver stability, humanitarian relief, and the beginnings of recovery. The Plan carried the full weight of Security Council authorization and the backing of a broader group of UN Member states who supported the initiative on the premise that it would end the mass killings of civilians and improve conditions for Palestinians in Gaza.

At the six-month mark, the April 2026 scorecard rated the ceasefire as failing. It earned just 5 of 26 possible points overall and zero out of 10 on humanitarian access. At that point, more than 700 Palestinians had been killed since the ceasefire began. Fewer than 100 UN-coordinated aid trucks were entering a day, against a minimum of 600. Over 50 percent of Gaza remained under Israeli military control. Six months later, every one of those measures has worsened. At the one-year mark, the ceasefire earns just 4 of 26 possible points.

In May, a new 15-point roadmap for implementation of the Plan was presented by the Board of Peace to the Security Council, but it was rejected by the Government of Israel. Instead, the Board of Peace continues to echo calls for conditioning humanitarian aid. Under international humanitarian law, all civilians in conflict, including under occupation, have the right to access aid.

In late September, after eleven months of political stagnation and impasse on humanitarian access, the Board of Peace unveiled a $2.45 billion reconstruction blueprint: the 6-month Gaza Recovery Program, a self-described "roadmap for delivery," that outlines 66 projects, that the National Committee for the Administration of Gaza (NCAG) can achieve in the first six-months of entering Gaza. To date, the NCAG has not been permitted to enter Gaza, and, once again, recovery–and, implicitly, humanitarian relief–is made contingent on Hamas disarmament. Apart from the return of hostages, not a single commitment in phase one has been met. Namely, the three commitments below have not been met and have, in some cases, regressed:

- **Maintenance of ceasefire.** Israeli government attacks have continued. The UN has reported daily Israeli airstrikes in densely populated areas and at least 1,650 have been killed and 5,975 wounded since the ceasefire was declared, more than double the toll at the six-month mark.
- **Israeli military expansion.** Instead of pulling back, Israeli forces have expanded and entrenched their positions. Israel's line of control of the Yellow Line has been pushed westward all year and now covers nearly 70 percent of Gaza–up from 58 percent at the start of the ceasefire–and the Israeli military has built a physical barrier more than 23 kilometers long inside Gaza.
- **Humanitarian access.** Aid remains severely constrained. An average of just 49 UN-coordinated trucks entered Gaza daily in September, against an agreed minimum of 600. Only 2 percent of them carried medical supplies, leading to critical shortages of the most basic medicines and medical supplies–resulting in deaths from treatable injuries and illnesses. Kerem Shalom remains the only crossing open for aid. At least four other main entry points remain closed, despite crossings like Erez having now been repaired and equipped to facilitate aid.

For civilians, the consequences are stark. Most of the population still cannot access affordable, nutritious food, and many lack sufficient water, sanitation, shelter, or health care. Some 1.8 million people now live in 1,739 displacement sites, a significant increase from roughly 1 million people living in 862 displacement sites in November 2025. As a fourth winter approaches, forced displacement and living conditions have continued to worsen. As of August, 94 percent of the population needed shelter or basic household assistance, including 1.2 million people facing Critical (Phase 4) or Catastrophic (Phase 5) shelter conditions. Rodents were reported in 89 percent of shelters, and nearly 1 million people live in sites at medium or high risk of flooding.

That warning came true in early November. Gaza's first winter storm flooded around 70,000 tents in a single day. An infant reportedly drowned, and five displaced people, three of them children, were killed when a sand embankment collapsed onto their tents west of Deir al-Balah. This was a clear, visible, and entirely preventable failure. For months, the UN warned that because nearly every critical shelter input–from tents and tarpaulins to timber, ropes, tools and solar systems–is classified by Israeli authorities as "dual-use," many materials were unlikely to reach Gaza in time for winter. When the storm hit, stocks of tents, tarpaulins, blankets and clothing inside Gaza were "virtually exhausted," while more than 150,000 tents, 300,000 tarpaulins and 500,000 blankets sat outside Gaza's borders, ready for dispatch. With all six wastewater treatment plants out of service and not a single hospital fully operational, the floodwater pooling in camps now mixes with sewage from damaged networks, creating public health risks that Gaza's health system cannot absorb.

Threats to civilian security remain high. Civilians continue to be killed and injured, including near the Yellow Line, in a security environment that resembles, for many, a seemingly free-fire zone rather than an established front line. The Yellow Line is itself a driver of displacement. At the start of the ceasefire, the area east of the line covered 58 percent of Gaza. Now, it is estimated that Israel occupies around 70 percent of Gaza, squeezing the population into the remaining 30 percent of an already overcrowded territory and forcing people to set up tents in flood-prone areas and unstable ground. As the line moves westward, often without warning, families living near it are forced to flee again. Most aid organizations are unable to operate within several kilometres of the line, cutting these communities off from assistance. The advancing line also increasingly cuts off the population from critical civilian infrastructure, including wells and agricultural lands.

Ongoing exposure to violence keeps protection and safety needs acute, and mental health has worsened across the population, with 89 percent of women and 85 percent of men reporting a decline.

The governance architecture meant to support the transition is no further along. Bodies such as the Gaza Executive Board and the National Committee for the Administration of Gaza (NCAG) have yet to be given consistent authority or show a clear impact on conditions inside Gaza. While the Board of Peace announced a $2.45 billion plan for the reconstruction of Gaza, the board admits that this will not be feasible under the current circumstances. If Israel continues to obstruct life-saving humanitarian aid, it is challenging to see how more advanced vehicles for recovery could progress.

If the ceasefire is to survive, the essential first step is to deliver on what was already promised.

Recommendations

To the UN Security Council, the Board of Peace, and Member States:

Lifesaving Aid and Medical Care

Use all available leverage to compel Israeli authorities to:

- Immediately clear for entry the tents, tarpaulins, and blankets already staged at Gaza's borders, and allow the unrestricted entry of all shelter materials. That means durable, quality materials, not tents and tarpaulins alone: timber for emergency shelter kits, insulation, raised flooring, caravans and prefabricated units, and materials to repair damaged buildings. Necessary materials also include heating fuel, engine oil, solar lighting, water pumps, and heavy machinery needed to keep sites livable, along with disability-adapted shelter kits, hearing-aid batteries, and other assistive devices.
- Facilitate a humanitarian response that meets the needs identified in a comprehensive humanitarian needs assessment.
- Ensure all the crossing points into Gaza are fully and consistently open in order to facilitate the predictable flow of goods at scale.
- Lift restrictions on pest-control, WASH, rubble-removal, and power-generation materials and spare parts, and bring the "dual-use" list in line with international standards.
- Ensure that international organizations with Palestinian Authority registration are permitted to operate freely throughout Gaza and the West Bank, including sending staff and supplies into Gaza at scale and without arbitrary constraints or delays.
- Immediately restore freedom of movement for Palestinians into and out of Gaza, including for urgent medical evacuations, ensuring access is not subject to arbitrary delay, denial, or quotas and that leaving does not lead to forfeiture of the right to return.
- Restore the medical corridor between Gaza and the West Bank, including East Jerusalem, so that patients can access urgent medical care within the Palestinian territory.

Additionally, Member States should work with the Board of Peace to implement the following steps:

Aid Oversight

- Replace the Israeli government approval process and military inspections of aid convoys with an independent, transparent system to process and verify humanitarian goods at Gaza's border crossings—one that eliminates current barriers that block and delay aid delivery.

- Develop a pre-agreed list of essential humanitarian items, which would address dual-use policies and allow expedited entry into Gaza.

Ceasefire Enforcement and Accountability

- Take measures to enforce a permanent and fully honored ceasefire across the whole of Gaza, including by setting up an independent UN-mandated mechanism to monitor, verify, and report violations.
- Mandate quarterly reporting to measure progress against independently verified humanitarian outcomes and benchmarks—civilian casualties, food security and malnutrition, prices, access to basic services, and freedom of movement—rather than aggregate truck or tonnage counts.
- Use the diplomatic, legal, and economic tools available to them—including existing legal restrictions on arms transfers and security assistance—to secure compliance with the ceasefire, UNSCR 2803, and protection of civilians obligations.

Recovery and Reconstruction

- Ensure recovery plans guarantee full freedom of movement across Gaza for Palestinians and do not contribute to the confinement or forced displacement of Palestinians.
- Translate political commitments in the New York Declaration into tangible, coordinated action in support of Gaza's recovery and reconstruction.

Methodology

These findings are based on the observations and experience of humanitarian organizations on the ground in Gaza and on available public data and secondary sources. The evaluation provides an independent, objective, and transparent assessment of the US-led 20-point Gaza peace plan and the UN Security Council Resolution 2803, supporting it. The benchmarks assessed here are those set by the plan itself. This differs from the standards humanitarian organizations typically apply, which measure direct impact on people. The following is an assessment (A–D categories) against the plan's own stated benchmarks, not independent humanitarian standards.

The scorecard uses a simple three-tier grading system for each indicator: green means full or significant progress and earns 2 points, yellow means partial or inconsistent implementation and earns 1 point, and red means non-compliance, significant delays, or backtracking and earns 0 points. Each metric is connected to a particular point in the 20-point plan and UNSCR 2803 as detailed in the table below. Indicator scores based on those metrics are then added up by section and across the full scorecard. The percentage of points earned determines the overall rating: 80–100 percent is "functional," 50–79 percent is "fragile," and anything below 50 percent is "failing."

SCORECARD

Assessment of Trump 20-Point Plan endorsed by UNSCR 2803 | November 2026

SCORING: 🟢 Green = Full or significant progress (2 pts) 🟡 Yellow = Partial or inconsistent implementation (1 pt) 🔴 Red = Non-compliance, significant delays, or backtracking (0 pts) **OVERALL: 80–100% = FUNCTIONAL 50–79% = FRAGILE <50% = FAILING**

●	Indicator	Source	🟢 Green	🟡 Yellow	🔴 Red	Current Status	Score
A. CEASEFIRE & CIVILIAN PROTECTION							
🟡	**A–1** Cessation of Hostilities and Civilian Protection	**20-Point Plan #3:** "all military operations, including aerial and artillery bombardment, will be suspended, and battle lines will remain frozen until conditions are met for the complete staged withdrawal." **20-Point Plan #4–5:** "Within 72 hours of Israel publicly accepting this agreement, all hostages, alive and deceased, will be returned. 5. Once all hostages are released, Israel will release 250 life sentence prisoners plus 1700 Gazans who were detained after October 7th 2023, including all women and children detained in that context. For every Israeli hostage whose remains are released, Israel will release the remains of 15 deceased Gazans." **UNSCR OP1:** "Endorses the Comprehensive Plan…and calls on all parties to implement it in its entirety, including maintenance of the ceasefire, in good faith and without delay;"	No airstrikes or artillery fire; positions stable; all hostages and detainees returned within 72 hours	Isolated/disputed incidents; corrective steps underway; most hostages and detainees returned	Sustained bombardment inconsistent with ceasefire; no hostages or detainees returned; ground operations to take more territory	At least, 1,650 killed and 5,975 wounded since the ceasefire. Yellow Line continues to advance, in 300–500 meter steps in northern Rafah; at least 224 Palestinians killed near the line by late February 2026 alone, including women and children; inability to rebuild humanitarian services in areas beyond the shifting Yellow Line. All hostages and 1,950 Palestinian detainees and prisoners in the agreement returned.	**1/2**

🔴	**A–2** No Occupation or Annexation	**20–Point Plan #16:** "Israel will not occupy or annex Gaza." **UNSCR OP7:** "As the ISF establishes control and stability, the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) will withdraw from the Gaza Strip based on standards, milestones, and timeframes linked to demilitarization that will be agreed between the IDF, ISF, the guarantors, and the United States, save for a security perimeter presence that will remain until Gaza is properly secure from any resurgent terror threat."	No legal/ administrative/ physical indicators of permanence	Ambiguous signals; no definitive permanence steps	Formal annexation steps; permanent structures established	Long–term military infrastructure now established: a physical barrier more than 23 km long built through demolished communities, fortified outposts, and continued demolitions. Israel's military chief of staff has called the Yellow Line Gaza's "new border," and in May 2026 the Prime Minister directed the army to expand control to 70 percent of Gaza.	**0/2**
Section A Total: 🔴 FAILING							**1/4**
B. HUMANITARIAN AID ACCESS							
🔴	**B–1** Aid Volume, Rehabilitation, and Reconstruction	**20–Point Plan #7:** "Upon acceptance of this agreement, full aid will be immediately sent into the Gaza Strip. At a minimum, aid quantities will be consistent with what was included in the January 19, 2025, agreement regarding humanitarian aid, including rehabilitation of infrastructure (water, electricity, sewage), rehabilitation of hospitals and bakeries, and entry of necessary equipment to remove rubble and open roads." **20–Point Plan #8:** "Entry of distribution and aid in the Gaza Strip will proceed without interference from the two parties through the United Nations and its agencies, and the Red Crescent, in addition to other international institutions not associated in any manner with either party." **UNSCR OP3:** "full resumption of humanitarian aid in cooperation with the BoP into the Gaza Strip in a manner consistent with relevant international legal principles and through cooperating organizations"	600+ UN–coordinated aid trucks/day; consistent with Jan 19, 2025 agreement minimums, including a substantial number of humanitarian trucks; reconstruction of infrastructure ongoing; rubble being cleared	300–400 UN–coordinated aid trucks/ day (below minimum but steady); some infrastructure rehabilitation and clearance underway	<200 UN–coordinated aid trucks/day (severe shortfall); little to no infrastructure rehabilitation and clearance of rubble	49 UN–coordinated trucks per day in September 2026. down from ~100/ day at six months; total entries of 142–165 trucks/day in April–June remained 70–75 percent below the 600/day benchmark.	**0/2**

🔴	**B–2** Border Crossings Operational	**20–Point Plan #8:** "Opening the Rafah crossing in both directions will be subject to the same mechanism implemented under the January 19, 2025 agreement."	All major crossings open daily; 12+ hours	Limited hours or 1–2 crossings operational	Most crossings closed or severely restricted	Rafah still closed for aid (Rafah open only for limited movement of people); Israeli crossings restricted with only Kerem Shalom open for aid as of October 2026; Kissufim, Gate 96, Erez, and Erez West remain closed, with no direct route for goods to northern Gaza despite border crossings repaired, equipped, and ready to facilitate aid entry.	**0/2**
🔴	**B–3** No Interference by Parties with Aid Distribution	**20–Point Plan #8:** "Entry of distribution and aid in the Gaza Strip will proceed without interference from the two parties through the United Nations and its agencies, and the Red Crescent, in addition to other international institutions not associated in any manner with either party. Opening the Rafah crossing in both directions will be subject to the same mechanism implemented under the January 19, 2025 agreement."	UN, ICRC, Red Crescent, major NGOs operate freely; no diversions reported	Recurring friction; partial remediation underway	Systematic impediments prevent aid flows	NGOs largely barred from bringing supplies into Gaza since March 2025; other agencies severely restricted from bringing in necessary supplies and personnel for the humanitarian response. Israel's High Court dismissed a petition by 19 INGOs on May 19, 2026; 37 INGOs remain unable to send international staff into Gaza or request approvals to import goods.	**0/2**
🔴	**B–4** Infrastructure Rehabilitation	**20–Point Plan #7:** "At a minimum, aid quantities will be consistent with what was included in the January 19, 2025, agreement regarding humanitarian aid, including rehabilitation of infrastructure (water, electricity, sewage), rehabilitation of hospitals and bakeries, and entry of necessary equipment to remove rubble and open roads." **UNSCR OP4:** Authorized the BoP to facilitate "the reconstruction of Gaza and of economic recovery programs" and "the coordination and supporting of and delivery of public services and humanitarian assistance in Gaza."	Hospitals, basic services, & bakeries restored; rubble removal underway	Partial restoration; equipment entering	No restoration; essential equipment unable to enter	Little infrastructure repair or rubble clearance in populated areas is possible given restrictions on the entry of critical supplies and equipment. Only 0.5 percent of an estimated 68 million tons of rubble had been cleared as of July 2026. Meanwhile, 76% of the road network remains destroyed and 90% of energy infrastructure remains destroyed, with no meaningful steps taken to repair them.	**0/2**

🔴	**B–5** Dual-Use Restrictions Policy Transparency	**20-Point Plan #7:** "At a minimum, aid quantities will be consistent with what was included in the January 19, 2025, agreement regarding humanitarian aid, including rehabilitation of infrastructure (water, electricity, sewage), rehabilitation of hospitals and bakeries, and entry of necessary equipment to remove rubble and open roads." **UNSCR OP3:** "full resumption of humanitarian aid in cooperation with the BoP into the Gaza Strip in a manner consistent with relevant international legal principles and through cooperating organizations"	Published, consistent policy; appeals mechanism available	Uneven enforcement; list partially disclosed	Classified list; item rejected without reasonable explanation	Dual-use list continues to be opaque and include unreasonable items such as hygiene products, critical medical and shelter supplies. Pest-control, WASH, rubble-removal, and heavy-machinery items remain blocked. One WHO shipment of prosthetics and assistive devices was rejected four times in six months. Nearly every critical shelter input is classified as dual-use. When Gaza's first winter storm hit, more than 150,000 tents, 300,000 tarpaulins and 500,000 blankets remained outside Gaza's borders.	**0/2**
Section B Total: 🔴 FAILING							**0/10**
C. RECONSTRUCTION & ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT							
🟡	**C–1** Trump Economic Development Plan Convened and Special Economic Zone (SEZ) Established	**20-Point Plan #2:** "Gaza will be redeveloped for the benefit of the people of Gaza, who have suffered more than enough." **20-Point Plan #10:** "A Trump economic development plan to rebuild and energize Gaza will be created by convening a panel of experts who have helped birth some of the thriving modern miracle cities in the Middle East." **20-Point Plan #11:** "A special economic zone will be established with preferred tariff and access rates to be negotiated with participating countries." **UNSCR OP6:** "Calls upon the World Bank and other financial institutions to facilitate and provide financial resources to support the reconstruction and development of Gaza, including through the establishment of a dedicated trust fund for this purpose and governed by donors."	Expert panel convened; development framework drafted; SEZ framework and preferred tariff rates negotiated	Consultations underway; no formal plan yet	No expert panel; no development plan	Board of Peace unveiled a $2.45 billion reconstruction blueprint in late September 2026, but it concedes nothing can begin without Hamas disarmament; no SEZ or preferential tariff terms negotiated; recovery and reconstruction needs have risen to $71.4 billion (April 2026 RDNA), up 34 percent in just over a year.	**1/2**

🔴	**C–2** Market Conditions & Price Stability	**20–Point Plan #10:** "Many thoughtful investment proposals and exciting development ideas have been crafted by well–meaning international groups, and will be considered to synthesize the security and governance frameworks to attract and facilitate these investments that will create jobs, opportunity, and hope for future Gaza." **20–Point Plan #8:** "Entry of distribution and aid in the Gaza Strip will proceed without interference from the two parties through the United Nations and its agencies, and the Red Crescent, in addition to other international institutions not associated in any manner with either party. Opening the Rafah crossing in both directions will be subject to the same mechanism implemented under the January 19, 2025 agreement."	Stable/affordable prices; no extreme inflation	Volatile; moderate inflation (50–100%)	Extreme inflation (>300%); with chronic shortages	Commercial flows have been unable to meet the needs of the population and virtually no private sector investment has taken place to alleviate conditions. Israel allows only a handful of traders to import supplies and goods (including those on the dual–use list) to Gaza and requires exorbitant "coordination fees" for every truck. This has led to volatile and exceedingly high prices on vital goods and supplies. Affordability remains the main barrier to market access for 81 percent of households, and the cost of engine oil for the generators that run water pumps and hospitals has at times surged to as high as $1,300 per liter. According to the September 2026 WFP Market Monitor, food baskets remain 40% higher than September 2023 and the food consumer price index remains 94.1% higher than in September 2023. Meanwhile, unemployment sits at 81%, eliminating purchasing power.	**0/2**
🟡	**C–3** Commercial Trucks Allowed to Enter as a Complement to Humanitarian Aid	**20–Point Plan #8:** "Entry of distribution and aid in the Gaza Strip will proceed without interference from the two parties through the United Nations and its agencies, and the Red Crescent, in addition to other international institutions not associated in any manner with either party." **UNSCR OP3:** Underscores the importance of the full resumption of humanitarian aid in cooperation with the BoP into the Gaza Strip in a manner consistent with relevant international legal principles and through cooperating organizations, including the United Nations, the International Committee of the Red Cross, and the Red Crescent	Unobstructed commercial and humanitarian access	Commercial entries partly displace humanitarian imports	Commercial entries substantially displace humanitarian imports	Truck entry dominated by commercial and bilateral goods—averaged 142–165 trucks/day in April–June. Commercial supply skews toward high–value, low–nutrition goods; in June 2026, shelter items were unavailable or in limited supply in every governorate.	**1/2**
Section C Total: 🔴 FAILING							**2/6**

D. FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT & RETURN							
🟡	**D–1** No Forced Displacement Out of Gaza	**20–Point Plan #12:** "No one will be forced to leave Gaza, and those who wish to leave will be free to do so and free to return. We will encourage people to stay and offer them the opportunity to build a better Gaza."	No forced displacement out of Gaza; People are are free to leave and return and stay in their areas to rebuild	No forced displacement orders issued, but coercive conditions remain and re-entry restricted	Palestinians forcibly removed from Gaza; coercive evacuation orders active	No forced removals out of Gaza to date, but more than 80 percent of the population remains displaced in highly coercive environment: 1.8 million people now live in 1,739 displacement sites (up from about 1 million in 862 sites in November 2025), and 45 percent of displaced households have been displaced seven times or more. The advancing Yellow Line is itself driving new displacement.	**1/2**
🔴	**D–2** Right to Movement & Civilian Access to Rebuild Gaza	**20–Point Plan #12:** "No one will be forced to leave Gaza, and those who wish to leave will be free to do so and free to return. We will encourage people to stay and offer them the opportunity to build a better Gaza." **20–Point Plan #16:** "Israel will not occupy or annex Gaza."	Gazans displaced by the war can return to homes freely	Partial return; some restricted zones	Return blocked; no return allowed beyond restricted lines; majority of Gaza inaccessible	Returns not permitted beyond Yellow Line and expanding Orange Line; most of the population still displaced; most unable to leave or return. Frequent injuries and deaths of Palestinians approaching an invisible and moving yellow line. Roughly 2 million people are now confined to about 30 percent of the Strip (an effective density of ~19,500 people per km²); in northern Rafah, some 13,000 people were at direct risk of forced displacement in July 2026.	**0/2**
🔴	**D–3** Medical Evacuations	**20–Point Plan #12 and UNSCR OP12:** "No one will be forced to leave Gaza, and those who wish to leave will be free to do so and free to return."	50+ per day; transparent criteria; no backlog	100–200 per week; sporadic approvals	<100 per week; major backlog; people dying waiting	Israel committed to 50 critical cases/day, yet WHO evacuations average under 100 per week during the ceasefire period; major backlog; the number of child medical evacuations fell by 75% since the first year of the conflict. Children continue to die on the waiting list. In the meantime, the medical corridor to the West Bank and East Jerusalem is still suspended.	**0/2**
Section D Total: **FAILING**							**1/6**

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OVERALL ASSESSMENT SUMMARY

Section	Score	Status
A. Ceasefire & Civilian Protection	**1/4**	FAILING
B. Humanitarian Aid Access	**0/10**	FAILING
C. Reconstruction & Economic Development	**2/6**	FAILING
D. Freedom of Movement & Return	**1/6**	FAILING
OVERALL TOTAL	**4/26**	FAILING

Analysis of Scorecard for Trump 20–Point Plan and United Nations Security Council Resolution 2803 Implementation

A. Ceasefire & Civilian Protection (A-1 to A-2)

1. Cessation of Hostilities and Civilian Protection

Benchmark: *Point 3 of the plan requires that "all military operations, including aerial and artillery bombardment, will be suspended," and UNSCR 2803 (OP1) calls for "maintenance of the ceasefire." The prisoner and detainee releases set out in Points 4–5 have been completed.*

The plan secured the release of all Israeli hostages, along with agreed numbers of Palestinian detainees. However, Israeli air strikes, artillery shelling, and drone attacks have continued to occur on residential buildings and makeshift tents where displaced families shelter. At least 1,650 killed and 5,975 wounded since the ceasefire was declared.". Most recently, on November 12, 2026, Israeli airstrikes hit the surgical wing of Nasser Hospital in Khan Younis and a vehicle outside Al-Shifa Hospital in Gaza City. According to Palestinian health officials, the Nasser Hospital attack killed at least seven people—including a surgeon—and wounded more than 20, while the strike near Al-Shifa killed two people.

Emergency medical services were responding to an estimated 200–250 security-related incidents a day in the second quarter of 2026, and since April military activity has increasingly occurred west of the Yellow Line, closer to populated areas and humanitarian operations. Physicians deployed to Gaza in August and September 2026 recorded airstrikes on most days, including 15 strikes across Gaza City in a single day. As the hospital's medical director put it to American ICU doctor Nahreen Ahmed: "The war is continuing, it has never stopped. The world thinks that the word ceasefire means we are fine. They are wrong."

Children have not been spared. In October alone, 14 students and eight education workers were killed, according to Gaza's Education Ministry, and UNICEF reports that 351 children have been killed since the ceasefire was announced. Dawud, a four-year-old shot in the head by a drone, died in the intensive care unit of Al-Shifa Hospital in September, nearly a year into the ceasefire.

Even the journey to class is not safe. In September, eight year old Wafaa Akila was killed alongside her father in western Gaza when an Israeli strike hit their car as they returned home from school. On October 17, a 14-year-old boy was killed by a drone strike while walking home from a UNICEF-supported learning center in Deir al-Balah.

Ongoing detentions fall outside the agreement's release terms and are not part of the A-1 score, but they remain a serious violation of international humanitarian law. While the Palestinian detainees specified in the agreement were released, Israel continues to arbitrarily detain at least 309 healthcare workers. Amongst them is Dr. Hussam Abu Safiya, pediatrician and director of Kamal Adwan Hospital, held without charge since December 2024 and reportedly subject to severe torture. As of October 2026, Israel holds an estimated 3,101 Palestinian administrative detainees from across the Occupied Palestinian Territories without trial.

In March 2026, Israeli authorities also extended the militarized buffer zone beyond the previous "Yellow Line," designating the expanded area the "Orange Line." The line has continued to move since. Advances are now proceeding in 300–500 meter steps, each cutting off access to more sites. Three UN workers have been killed since mid-March 2026, and relief efforts in the area between the Yellow and Orange Lines have been repeatedly suspended. Moving the line raises concerns about further displacement, access to services and infrastructure, and exposure to Israeli military operations.

2. No Occupation or Annexation

Benchmark: *Point 16 of the plan states that "Israel will not occupy or annex Gaza," and UNSCR 2803 (OP7) provides that the IDF "will withdraw from the Gaza Strip based on standards, milestones, and timeframes linked to demilitarization.*

The Israeli government is building permanent structures and creating conditions on the ground in the areas it occupies that could amount to de facto annexation, contrary to the plan's commitment that "Israel will not occupy or annex Gaza." The Israeli military has confirmed it has built a physical barrier more than 23 kilometers long through demolished Palestinian communities—extending for more than half the length of the Strip—and satellite imagery from late July 2026 shows a ground barrier being built hundreds of meters beyond the Yellow Line in southern Rafah. Israel's military chief of staff has publicly described the line as Gaza's "new border," and in May 2026 the Prime Minister directed the army to expand its control to 70 percent of the Strip.

Additionally, prominent politicians have announced that the next Israeli government should "empty Gaza" and annex it. In October, National Security Minister Ben-Gvir said "we have to capture all of Gaza" and "Gaza was always ours." Following the October parliamentary elections, Finance Minister Bezalel Smotrich told supporters that "Jewish settlements will rise in Gaza."

B. Humanitarian Aid Access (B-1 to B-5)

1. Aid Volume, Rehabilitation, and Reconstruction

Benchmark: *Point 7 of the plan requires that "full aid will be immediately sent into the Gaza Strip," at a minimum "consistent with what was included in the January 19, 2025, agreement regarding humanitarian aid" (600 trucks a day). UNSCR 2803 (OP3) calls for the "full resumption of humanitarian aid… in a manner consistent with relevant international legal principles."*

The UN resolution and point 7 of the 20-point plan call for immediate "full" aid with minimum humanitarian aid quantities consistent with levels agreed to during the January 2025 ceasefire (+600 trucks per day). While Israeli authorities have claimed up to 600 trucks entering daily, much of this is not humanitarian aid as required in the 20-point plan. In the first six months of the ceasefire, aid trucks delivered to Gaza averaged fewer than 100 aid trucks a day coordinated by the UN under the 2720 mechanism. This mechanism was created in 2023 by the United Nations Security Council under UN Security Council Resolution 2720, specifically to speed up humanitarian aid into Gaza by appointing a UN Humanitarian and Reconstruction Coordinator to verify shipments and facilitate their delivery while addressing Israeli security concerns. The rest are commercial goods and bilateral aid convoys that are not independently tracked or monitored. The benchmark is humanitarian aid specifically.

Israeli claims that up to 600 trucks are entering daily count commercial goods and bilateral convoys alongside aid. Even by that metric–which itself deviates from the 20-point plan–the numbers are falling short. Total truck entries of all kinds, humanitarian and commercial, averaged 142 to 165 a day between April and June, 70 to 75 percent below the benchmark. The head of Gaza's private truckers' union puts current entries at about 300 a day, two-thirds of them carrying commercial goods, which would leave roughly 100 trucks a day of aid. Even applied to Israel's own figure of 600, the same share would leave only about 200 aid trucks a day, a third of the required minimum. UN-coordinated aid tracked under the 2720 mechanism–the only flow that is independently monitored–averaged fewer than 100 trucks a day in the first six months of the ceasefire and just 49 a day in September.

Commercial goods are not a viable substitute for sufficient aid. Israel allows only a limited number of traders to import, and the coordination fees and unofficial charges they pay at the crossings are passed on to consumers (see Market Conditions). Nearly all–90 percent–of the population still relies on humanitarian food aid, and 81 percent of households cite cost as the main barrier to markets. Goods most people cannot afford do not meet the needs the January 2025 humanitarian minimum was meant to cover. By any count, whether Israel's, the UN's, or Gaza's private sector's, the humanitarian aid benchmark has not been met.

Meanwhile, less than 25 percent of the $4.06 billion 2026 Flash Appeal had been funded by mid-year, and the number of families receiving shelter assistance fell by 37 percent between May and June. In October 2026, only 74 of 119 missions requested to the

Israeli authorities were facilitated without impediment. Between May and October 2026, only 69 percent of requested missions were completed without impediment.

As of early October, Kerem Shalom remains the only operational crossing for cargo. Zikim (Erez West) has been closed since May 24, 2026; Kissufim, Gate 96 and Erez remain closed; and Rafah is open only for the limited movement of people, heightening market vulnerability.

Health and Medical

Benchmark: *Point 7 of the plan requires "full aid," including the "rehabilitation of hospitals," and UNSCR 2803 (OP3) calls for aid to be delivered "in a manner consistent with relevant international legal principles." Restrictions on medical supplies and equipment are assessed under B-1, B-4 and B-5, and medical evacuations under D-3.*

Over a year since the ceasefire was declared, Gaza's health system remains in ruins. Israeli strikes on health facilities continue, contrary to the ceasefire commitment to allow for hospital rehabilitation. As of October 2026, only 47 percent of health service points were even partially functioning across the Strip, and there are still no fully functional hospitals. Shortages of fuel, engine oil, and generator spare parts undermine the functioning of all facilities, while shortages of essential medicines continue to threaten dialysis, cancer treatment, and chronic disease care in particular. In September, the director of Al-Shifa Medical Complex reported that 50 percent of listed medicines were completely out of stock, alongside a 70 percent shortage of medical consumables and about 80 percent of laboratory materials. More than 70,000 people with diabetes, including about 2,500 children, faced shortages of insulin pens and glucose test strips. OCHA reports that trauma, surgical and rehabilitation supplies, IV fluids, anesthesia, and specialized medicines such as Type 1 insulin analogues remain scarce "due to ongoing aid entry restrictions."

Physicians deployed to Gaza describe what this means at the bedside. According to Dr. Nahreen Ahmed, an American ICU specialist, who served in Gaza between August and September 2026, the shortages and Israeli restrictions are dire for patients. All of Gaza's kidney patients are served by 75 dialysis machines, leaving many with two short sessions a week instead of three full ones. ICU staff ration a single box of gloves a day. Nurses delay pain medication during wound dressing to preserve stock, and morphine for the dying is rationed.

Diagnosis has become guesswork. There is no MRI anywhere in Gaza, mammography and CT capacity is severely limited, and only four histopathologists serve the entire territory, which means cancers often go undiagnosed and untreated.

Respiratory illness is rampant. Respiratory infections accounted for 59 percent of communicable disease cases recorded in early

October. Complicated pneumonias, lung abscesses and asthma-like disease in previously healthy people are due to a range of factors, including malnutrition, overcrowding, cooking over burning plastic and waste inside tents, and repeated exposure to blast dust. According to Dr. Ahmed, suspected tuberculosis patients are treated in shared wards without airborne isolation or N95 masks. With winter approaching and no consistent supply of pneumonia or influenza vaccines, ICU staff expect respiratory admissions to climb.

Infections that should be easily treatable are turning deadly. Malnutrition has left much of the population immunocompromised, and antibiotic resistance is rising: one hospital study found that two-thirds of Pseudomonas isolates were multidrug-resistant. Without labs to culture bacteria and identify the right antibiotic, doctors cannot target treatment. Physicians describe routine urinary tract infections, gastroenteritis and injection-site abscesses progressing to septic shock. Complicated urinary tract infections are common among otherwise healthy women, who drink less water than their family members and avoid unlit, distant latrines at night out of concern for their safety.

The situation is also dire for cancer patients. Chemotherapy and biological treatment were suspended for roughly 11,000 patients as of September, about 4,500 of whom urgently need it. Screening and treatment for cervical and breast cancer have been largely suspended since October 2023, and the health ministry has documented about 664 breast cancer cases, including 105 new cases this year, facing delays across diagnosis, treatment, and referral.

Mothers and newborns are still at serious risk. One in three pregnancies is high-risk, and about one in five babies is born both too early and too small. At Nasser Hospital, up to 60 babies must share 20 incubators, and staff report some newborns have died from infections they caught from the babies beside them.

Almost half of births are by Caesarean section–many emergencies–and women are discharged hours after their operations due to overcrowding. More than half of pregnant women are anemic, many severely, making premature births and life-threatening postpartum hemorrhages more likely, especially given incidence of malnourishment.

Behind all of this is a health workforce that has been decimated and exhausted.

Malnutrition

Benchmark: *Point 7 of the plan requires "full aid," including the "rehabilitation of… bakeries," and Point 8 requires that aid "proceed without interference from the two parties." UNSCR 2803 (OP3) calls for aid to be delivered "in a manner consistent with relevant international legal principles." Food prices and market supply are assessed under C-2 and C-3.*

The latest IPC analysis found that more than 1.4 million people, 67 percent of Gaza's population, are expected to face Crisis or worse levels of food insecurity through December 2026, including 212,000 in Emergency. Gains since the ceasefire announcement remain fragile. Without food assistance, the IPC estimates that 1.9 million people would face high levels of acute food insecurity, and assistance has since been cut sharply.

Acute malnutrition among young children has fallen sharply, showing what happens when aid gets in. Admissions for treatment peaked at nearly 17,000 children in August 2025 and fell below 3,000 by March 2026. A MedGlobal survey found that acute malnutrition among children under five halved between July 2025 and July 2026, from 16.8 to 8.4 percent. But these gains are fragile, and the longer-term damage is mounting. About 3,000 children are still admitted for malnutrition treatment every month. Nutrition Cluster surveys in early June found that 12.2 percent of children suffered from stunting, indicative of sustained under-nutrition. More than 37 percent of children had suffered from diarrhea in the two weeks before the survey, nearly 32 percent had fevers, and only 30 percent of children aged 6–23 months achieved minimum dietary diversity.

Physicians working in Gaza in August and September 2026 report that many children appear years younger than their age, a sign of stunting that can impair development and immunity for life, and that malnourished children are developing complicated pneumonias and sepsis from otherwise routine infections. As one doctor put it: "Chocolate and biscuits are the only thing that is cheap. It's probably to make it look like we're not starving" (As noted above, the availability of these kinds of food rather than more nutritious options is a direct reflection of Israel's prioritization of non-aid commercial shipments over humanitarian aid inflows). Chronic malnutrition is harder to survey as well.

Global aid cuts also threaten to reverse any gains. Because of funding shortfalls, partners expect to reach fewer than one million of Gaza's 2.1 million people with monthly food aid from October. If Israel's suspension of shipments from Egypt continues, the Food Security Sector warns that daily cooked meals could fall by about 45 percent, from roughly 600,000 to 330,000.

Pregnant and breastfeeding mothers, and children, are particularly vulnerable, with 7.2 percent of pregnant and breastfeeding women found to be acutely malnourished and 74,200 small babies and children expected to require nutrition treatment or support between May 2026 and April 2027.

As of September, people in Gaza still could not afford a varied diet. Dietary diversity remained "critically" limited because nutritious food was too expensive. On average, households ate fruit only about one day every two weeks and protein-rich foods one day a week, and they ate few vegetables. Wheat flour prices rose and fell in mid-September and stayed higher than in previous months.

Cooking fuel was also out of reach for most people. A September analysis found that only 4–9 percent of people could get cooking gas. Some 77 percent were burning waste to cook–up from August–posing serious risks to health and the environment.

Among surveyed households, 96 percent said money problems limited their access to markets. Severe hunger continued across Gaza: nearly one in five households went to bed hungry more than 10 times in the previous 30 days, and more than a quarter ran out of food completely more than 10 times.

Markets remained unstable, with "dramatic" price swings and "major" cash shortages. According to WFP monitoring, nearly 60 percent of surveyed shops were less than 40 percent full.

Shelter Conditions

Benchmark: *Point 7 of the plan requires that "full aid will be immediately sent into the Gaza Strip," at a minimum "consistent with what was included in the January 19, 2025, agreement regarding humanitarian aid," including the rehabilitation of infrastructure and "entry of necessary equipment to remove rubble and open roads." UNSCR 2803 (OP3) calls for aid to be delivered "in a manner consistent with relevant international legal principles." The Board of Peace reinforced this in its November 9, 2026, statement, declaring the flooding of displaced persons' shelters an "immediate humanitarian emergency" and calling on Israel to authorize the entry of materials for temporary shelter, water and sanitation infrastructure, drainage, and sewage removal, in line with commitments under the Comprehensive Peace Plan.*

The season's first winter storm, which hit Gaza on the night of November 6, has already made these risks deadly. An infant reportedly drowned at a displacement site, and five displaced people—three children and two women—were killed when a sandy hill collapsed onto their tents at Al Berka Reservoir. Within 12 hours, some 70,000 tents were flooded, according to Gaza's Government Media Office. The UN reports that more than 26,000 households have sought help, more than 6,000 family shelters were destroyed and 17,400 damaged, and more than 3,900 households now have no shelter at all. Floodwater rose to 1.5 meters in places, and Civil Defense could respond to only 218 of 2,166 distress calls. Al–Shifa's emergency department flooded and was out of service for about four hours. Water also entered Nasser Medical Complex, a hospital basement housing pediatrics, the pharmacy and radiology flooded, and clinics lost tents and roofing, forcing some partners to suspend mobile clinics and reproductive health services. At Sheikh Radwan lagoon, stormwater mixed with sewage from broken networks, and UN partners had to pump sewage–laden water out of 58 shelters. Aid stocks of tents, tarpaulins and blankets inside Gaza are now "virtually exhausted." Meanwhile, more than 150,000 tents, 300,000 tarpaulins and 500,000 blankets are waiting outside Gaza, including about 117,000 tents in Al–Arish, Egypt.

None of this was a surprise. It was predictable, and it was preventable. Every part of the disaster had been mapped, measured and publicly reported for months: where the water would collect, who would be in its path, what they lacked, and what was waiting at the border. In early September, two months before the floods, the UN Emergency Relief Coordinator Tom Fletcher announced on X that the UN was working to avert winter flooding, and called for approval of essential relief supplies. The Board of Peace likewise issued a statement after the November flooding noting that "for months the Board of Peace has warned of the very conditions now unfolding…[w]e have specifically urged the Israeli government to authorize the entry of essential materials for temporary shelter, water and sanitation infrastructure, waste management, drainage, and sewage removal."

In September, around 60 percent of Gaza's displaced population, an estimated 956,389 people, were living in sites at medium or high risk of flooding, including more than 400,000 in high-risk areas. The majority of these sites (80 percent) are makeshift, and the risk is highest in low-lying areas, near shorelines and lagoons, and where drainage is blocked. That is the kind of ground that flooded this weekend. The UN had also warned about the inability to operate and maintain sewage and stormwater systems and about wastewater hazards at displacement sites. The situation has also pushed people into living in dangerously damaged buildings for shelter. OCHA reports that the storm caused the collapse of damaged buildings, and that thousands of people remain in damaged buildings at risk of collapse.

A representative household assessment by the Shelter Cluster in June 2026 found that shelter needs were near-universal: an estimated 1.98 million people—94 percent of the population—were in Crisis, Critical or Catastrophic shelter conditions, including 58 percent in the two most severe phases. Some 65 percent of households lived in tents or makeshift shelters, more than half of them in poor or very poor condition, and 71 percent had been flooded the previous winter. Yet only 10 percent had received any shelter or non-food item assistance in the previous month, and in-country stocks of tents, blankets and mattresses were nearly depleted by June, five months before the storm. Vermin and parasite infestations make conditions worse: 89 percent of households reported rodents inside their shelter, and 79 percent reported other vectors such as mosquitoes, ticks or lice. Skin rashes spread by pests are widespread, and doctors have reported otherwise healthy people going septic and dying from skin infections. Nearly half of households burn plastic, tires, garbage or cardboard to cook.

Gaza has now entered a fourth winter of displacement with even less protection. By October of this year, WHO warned that almost two million people needed shelter to protect them from the cold and flooding. People with disabilities face the starkest risks. Among households that include a person with a disability, 84 percent face severe or extreme winter exposure (97 percent of those in tents), 95 percent lack sufficient blankets and clothing, and 72 percent have no accessible toilet. In 62 percent of these households, floodwater traps the person with a disability inside or outside the shelter.

The supplies to prevent much of this exist, but they have not been allowed in fast enough. An estimated 294,250 families need shelter assistance, yet current stocks and pipeline supplies can only partly help about 52,000 of them, or 18 percent. NRC

estimates that at least 500 truckloads of shelter items are in the pipeline. Approval is only the first hurdle. Israeli authorities allow just 15 trucks of "dual-use" items a week from Jordan, shared across all aid sectors and offloaded at Kerem Shalom one day a week. At that pace, the shelter supplies already in the pipeline would take more than seven months to enter: deliveries starting in early October would not finish until about late May, after the winter rains have passed. In the week of September 21–27, just 25 trucks carried tents or awnings, eight carried blankets or mattresses and one carried clothing, and IOM's emergency shelter kits have been repeatedly turned away at the crossings.

With so little allowed in through aid channels, families who try to buy shelter on Gaza's local market face prices they cannot pay. As of October 2026, shelter and household items cost up to 16 times the international procurement price. A tarpaulin that costs $11 to procure internationally sells for $142 in Gaza, a solar light for $131 instead of $8, and an emergency shelter kit for about $4,000 instead of $300. These prices are a direct result of aid obstruction and the system described under Market Conditions (C–2). With only a handful of traders allowed to import, and coordination fees charged on every truck, scarce shelter goods reach Gaza at prices most families cannot pay, which leaves them dependent on the very aid that is being held at the border.

Shelter is one of Gaza's most immediate needs and one of the simplest to meet. The early November deaths and losses came from risks that were known, needs that were documented, and supplies that were held at the border. The heaviest rains are still ahead. Every week of delay will mean more flooded tents, more disease and more lives lost.

Water, Sanitation, and Hygiene

Benchmark: *Point 7 of the plan requires "full aid," including the "rehabilitation of infrastructure (water, electricity, sewage)," and UNSCR 2803 (OP3) calls for aid to be delivered "in a manner consistent with relevant international legal principles."*

Assessments in July found that 90 percent of assessed households experienced moderate to severe water insecurity and 84 percent of households reported the same conditions in September. Median drinking water access stood at about 4.5 liters of water per person per day in July, with access to just 12.1 liters of domestic water daily. By September, median drinking water stood at just 4.3 liters per person per day. The Sphere humanitarian standards set a minimum of 15 liters of water per person per day for drinking, cooking, and basic hygiene in emergencies. Domestic water access increased only slightly by September. Meanwhile, the three cross-border Mekorot pipelines seldom operate at full capacity and frequently come under Israeli attack.

Access barriers to hygiene products also remained severe over the year, with 89 percent of households reporting insufficient access to hygiene items in September. In July, more than half of households reported "always/often" worrying about not having enough water, with more than a third saying they "always/often" lacked enough water to drink, and more than a quarter saying they always or often had not usable or drinkable water at all. These numbers saw only limited improvement in September.

By July, 87 percent of households still reported barriers to accessing toilets or latrines, most commonly a lack of water, a lack of privacy, cleanliness issues, and fear of rodents and pests. By September, 83 percent still cited similar constraints, though more reported non-functionality of facilities.

Microbiological contamination in water remained high in July–August, with fecal coliforms detected in nearly 18 percent of samples. Nearly 74 percent of water tested in August also remained non-compliant with chlorination standards.

With Gaza's wastewater system out of action, more than 150,000 cubic meters of untreated wastewater are discharged into the environment every day. In July 2026, 9,300 cases of chickenpox were recorded in a single month, roughly half of them in Khan Younis displacement sites, and on October 1, OCHA warned of serious public health risks from solid waste accumulating in the heart of Gaza City.

Additionally, the private sector faces significant restrictions on importing hygiene items, making it nearly impossible for people to afford these items themselves. These factors heighten reliance on the humanitarian system for basic hygiene items. Affected supplies include soap, dish washing liquid, shampoo, sanitary products, laundry powder, and plastic bags for domestic waste. Arbitrary restrictions on the overall volume of pallets into Gaza also creates constraints on the range and number of items humanitarian actors are able to import.

Vector control has become an urgent public health crisis. As mentioned, reports of rodent and insect infestations are mounting across displacement camps, yet Gaza currently has no available rodenticides or insecticides due to ongoing Israeli entry restrictions. In North Gaza, 41 percent of households affected by rodents reported that a family member had been bitten or injured. As winter begins, WHO warns of a heightened risk of preventable disease outbreaks linked to the absence of safe shelter, a lack of clean water, and the high number of rats, whose bites transmit infection.

Only 50 percent of waste-collection vehicles remain operational, with fleets largely grounded by Israeli restrictions on engine oil, spare parts, and electro-mechanical equipment, and Israeli authorities continue to ban access to key sanitary landfills near the Green Line.

Education

Benchmark: *Point 3 of the plan requires that "all military operations, including aerial and artillery bombardment, will be suspended," and Point 7 requires "full aid" at a minimum consistent with the January 2025 agreement. UNSCR 2803 (OP4) authorizes support for the delivery of public services, including education, in Gaza.*

Gaza's children have now lost three full school years of formal in-person education. Since the war began, more than 20,500 students and more than 1,050 education workers have been killed. Since classes resumed in September 2026, the killing has not stopped.

Despite the dangers and lack of teachers and safe learning environments, when the new school year began on September 19, 2026, about 541,000 students returned to some form of in-person learning, but almost entirely in tents, damaged buildings, and makeshift learning spaces. Nearly 98 percent of school buildings have been damaged or destroyed, and more than 93 percent require major rehabilitation or full reconstruction. An estimated 200,000 school-age children remain without any structured learning.

Conditions in temporary spaces are dire. Classes are held on sand and bare floors, sometimes with only mattresses and a blackboard. Young children write on cardboard, and some schools shorten the day to three hours because of security risks. Restrictions on entry have kept stationery, desks, and chairs in short supply. Palestinian authorities reported in September that Israel blocked a UNICEF shipment of school bags and stationery, and a notebook that once cost 3 shekels now sells for 15.

More than lost learning is at stake: about 56,000 children reached school age during the war without ever being in a classroom. Israel's destruction of education has also taken away one of the few systems that protect children from the harms of violence and displacement, which raises protection risks and damages their mental health, wellbeing, and future prospects.

2. Border Crossings Operational

Benchmark: *Point 8 of the plan states that "Opening the Rafah crossing in both directions will be subject to the same mechanism implemented under the January 19, 2025 agreement," and the aid volumes required under Point 7 depend on crossings operating consistently and at scale.*

The Kerem Shalom crossing remains the only operational crossing through which humanitarian and commercial cargo can enter Gaza, and access through even that crossing is inconsistent and limited. The Rafah crossing remains closed for cargo and open only for the limited movement of people, including patients, while at least four other main entry points—Kissufim, Gate 96, Erez, and Erez West—remain closed. Erez, in particular, is now repaired and equipped to immediately facilitate aid entry, with no justifiable reason to continue delaying its reopening. As WHO's representative in the occupied Palestinian territory said in October 2026: "Our ask is simple and has not changed: we need the unimpeded and predictable entry of humanitarian and health supplies into Gaza at scale."

3. No Interference by Parties with Aid Distribution

Benchmark: *Point 8 of the plan requires that aid "proceed without interference from the two parties through the United Nations and its agencies, and the Red Crescent," and UNSCR 2803 (OP3) calls for aid to be delivered "in a manner consistent with relevant international legal principles."*

For people in Gaza, obstruction of aid is the central factor deciding whether they receive any meaningful support at all. Since the ceasefire was announced, the Yellow Line has remained a hard barrier to both return and access. As noted above, in mid-March 2026, Israeli authorities introduced a second demarcation, the Orange Line, drawn farther west to take in roughly 11 percent of Gaza's territory beyond the Yellow Line. As a result, dozens of humanitarian facilities now sit between the two lines, where relief efforts have been repeatedly suspended. The toll on humanitarian workers themselves has been unprecedented: at least 596 aid workers and more than 1,700 health workers have been killed in Gaza since October 2023, and the occupied Palestinian territory accounted for more than half of all aid worker deaths recorded worldwide in 2025. This level of loss continues to affect the response as health and aid workers remain at risk.

UNRWA, still the largest service provider in Gaza, has continued to be barred from directly bringing in aid and humanitarian personnel and faces enormous funding challenges, impeding their ability to continue to support Palestinians in Gaza. By the

end of 2025, 37 NGOs were ordered by Israeli authorities to cease operations in the occupied Palestinian territory by the end of February 2026 under revised Israeli registration rules, after declining to submit full lists of their Palestinian staff. In February 2026, 19 of these organizations petitioned Israel's High Court; the court dismissed the petition on May 19. Their international staff can no longer access Gaza or the West Bank, including East Jerusalem, and they cannot request approvals to import goods. The consequences will be felt most sharply this winter in Gaza. Before the rules took effect, these organizations were the backbone of the winter response: since early 2025, INGOs implemented 74 percent of shelter and non-food item activities and delivered 83 percent of all non-food items.

4. Infrastructure Rehabilitation

Benchmark: *The 20-point plan promised the rehabilitation of water, electricity, and sewage infrastructure, hospitals and bakeries, and the entry of equipment to remove rubble and open roads. A year later, almost none of this has begun. The barrier is not a lack of plans or funding pledges but Israeli restrictions on the materials, machinery, and spare parts needed to do the work.*

With 90 percent of energy infrastructure destroyed and no reliable electricity, Gaza runs on backup generators that were never designed to operate around the clock. Keeping them running requires engine oil, yet between March and early September, Israeli authorities approved only 13,445 liters, while 92,778 liters remained pending. They also tightly restrict new generators and spare parts, and more durable solutions—solar panels, reconnecting the electricity grid, and restarting the Gaza Power Plant—all depend on Israeli permission that has not been granted. OCHA warns that without them, adult and neonatal ventilators could stop working, cold chains could fail, and ambulance services could be interrupted.

All six wastewater treatment plants remain non-functional, and 70 percent of sewage pumping stations are inoperable. The Southern Gaza Desalination Plant is producing below capacity because replacement membranes and spare parts are held up by bureaucratic and administrative impediments imposed by Israeli authorities, leaving 74 percent of the population dependent on trucked drinking water. On November 1, Gaza's water utility warned of cascading failures across water and sanitation systems, just as the rains begin and pumps are needed to clear floodwater and sewage.

Only 50 percent of waste-collection vehicles remain operational, and just 0.5 percent of an estimated 68 million tons of rubble had been cleared by July. Without heavy machinery, people are doing this work by hand. In late October, a man was killed when sand collapsed on him as he dug a cesspit, because the materials to connect latrines to the sewage network are largely unavailable.

As described above, hospitals remain only partially functional. Bakeries remain at the mercy of supply disruptions, as the October halt in commercial flour showed (see Section C).

Israeli authorities have made clear that this is policy, not delay. In September, COGAT said it would not allow heavy equipment or reconstruction materials into Gaza until Hamas is disarmed, turning the plan's unconditional promise of rehabilitation into a political bargaining chip.

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5. "Dual Use" Restrictions Policy Transparency

Benchmark: *Point 7 of the plan requires the "entry of necessary equipment to remove rubble and open roads" alongside the rehabilitation of infrastructure, hospitals, and bakeries, and UNSCR 2803 (OP3) calls for aid to be delivered "in a manner consistent with relevant international legal principles."*

Under the "dual-use" policy, Israeli authorities block any item they claim may be used for military purposes. But there is still no public list of restricted items, no published criteria, no meaningful way to appeal, and some select traders still seem to be able to bring in so-called dual-use goods. Aid organizations learn what is blocked only when their shipments are rejected, often without explanation, and items approved one week can be refused the next.

The policy has been applied to the most basic humanitarian supplies. Tents, tarpaulins, timber, tools, ropes, tape, kitchen sets, and solar lights have all been classified as dual-use. So have ultrasound machines, incubators, ventilators, and mobile maternity units. Even approved dual-use items face hard limits: 15 truckloads a week from Jordan, shared across all aid sectors, offloaded on a single day. In August, Israeli authorities approved a shipment of 36,960 pieces of timber and 660 emergency shelter kits, then rejected it twice at the crossing and denied a renewed request. Partners were later told that timber requests would be denied for all organizations. A WHO shipment of prosthetics and assistive devices was rejected four times in six months, while more than 5,000 people in Gaza have lost limbs.

Physicians see the consequences at the bedside. Dr. Nahreen Ahmed, an American ICU specialist who worked in Gaza in August and September 2026, describes CPAP machines for infants being nonexistent, forcing doctors to improvise breathing support for babies from water bottles and IV tubing. Cardiac stents are unavailable except for the handful health workers carry in their luggage and are sometimes confiscated. Ventilators arrive without batteries or sensors, so when a machine loses power, no alarm sounds. Oxygen generators are missing parts, limiting how many tanks can be refilled. "Patients with heart attacks, operable cancers and blocked airways are dying for want of equipment that is routine elsewhere," she says.

The restrictions also reach the everyday items people need to stay healthy. As mentioned earlier, pest-control chemicals are blocked, leaving Gaza with no rodenticides or insecticides while 89 percent of households report rodents in their shelters. Water, sanitation, and rubble-removal equipment remain restricted, and the private sector faces limits on importing soap, sanitary products, and laundry powder.

Dual-use restrictions should be aligned to international standards, as established under the Wassenaar Arrangement on Export Controls for Conventional Arms and Dual-Use Goods and Technologies, which is supported by the United States. To ensure transparency Israeli authorities should publish the list of restricted or excluded items, explain each rejection, set clear timelines, and offer a way to appeal. None of this exists over a year into the ceasefire.

C. Reconstruction & Economic Development (C-1 to C-3)

1. Trump Economic Development Plan Convened and Special Economic Zone (SEZ) Established

Benchmark: Point 10 of the plan commits to "A Trump economic development plan to rebuild and energize Gaza," Point 11 to "A special economic zone," and Point 2 to Gaza being "redeveloped for the benefit of the people of Gaza." UNSCR 2803 (OP6) calls on the World Bank and other financial institutions to support reconstruction and development, including through a dedicated trust fund.

Measured against its own economic promises, the plan has so far produced presentations rather than progress. In January, the Board of Peace unveiled a master plan at the World Economic Forum in Davos that promised to lift Gaza's GDP to $10 billion by 2035, create 500,000 jobs and attract at least $25 billion in investment, with nearly the entire seafront zoned for coastal tourism and as many as 180 high-rises. Critics noted it was drawn up without consulting Palestinians. Since then, no panel of experts has been announced and no special economic zone has been established. The money has not followed either. The World Bank set up a dedicated Gaza Reconstruction and Development Fund in November 2025, as UNSCR 2803 requested. By late May, the fund had not received a single dollar, despite some $17 billion in pledges, including $10 billion from the United States. The donations that have arrived were instead routed to a private JPMorgan account without the World Bank fund's oversight and transparency requirements. The Board said deposits would wait for the reconstruction phase, and that phase has not begun.

In late September 2026, the Board of Peace unveiled a $2.45 billion reconstruction blueprint, but the plan itself concedes that nothing can begin without Hamas disarmament. Meanwhile, the cost of inaction keeps rising: recovery and reconstruction

needs climbed from an estimated $53.09 billion in February 2025 to $71.4 billion in the April 2026 Rapid Damage and Needs Assessment—an increase of 34 percent in just over a year—and UNDP and ESCWA estimate that the war has set Gaza's human development back by 77 years.

2 & 3. Market Conditions & Price Stability; Commercial Trucks Allowed to Enter as a Complement to Humanitarian Aid

Benchmark: *Point 10 of the plan envisages investments "that will create jobs, opportunity, and hope for future Gaza," and Point 8 provides for the entry of aid without interference. UNSCR 2803 (OP3) calls for aid to be delivered in line with international legal principles. These indicators assess whether commercial goods complement humanitarian aid rather than substitute for it, and whether essential goods are available and affordable.*

Despite more goods entering Gaza, commercial flows still fail to provide the essential items people need, and most families cannot afford what is available. What does come in skews away from what households need most. In the week of October 12–18, the private sector brought in 315 truckloads: 223 carried food and 51 carried non-essential items, while just 12 carried hygiene and shelter materials and one carried medicines. About two-thirds of all trucks entering carry commercial goods rather than aid (see Aid Volume).

The cost of getting goods in itself drives up prices. Israel allows only a limited number of traders to import, and Gaza's Chamber of Commerce says traders have paid more than $2.06 billion in coordination fees and unofficial charges at the crossings between October 2023 and late July 2026–costs that are ultimately passed on to consumers. Gaza's extreme dependence on imports through a single crossing also leaves it exposed to regional shocks. When the war with Iran began in February, truck entries fell by 80 percent in two weeks and the cost of living for families roughly doubled.

Affordability remains the binding constraint. Nearly all of the population (90 percent) still relies on humanitarian food aid, and household food access remains severely limited by a lack of purchasing power. In a June 2026 household assessment, 81 percent of households cited cost as the main barrier to market access, 70 percent could not afford heating fuel or electricity, and all shelter items were either unavailable or in limited supply in every governorate. Unemployment and unpaid salaries mean that even when prices ease, few families can buy what is on the shelves. One senior physician at Al-Shifa Hospital reported spending about $60 a day, roughly $1,000 a month, on the two liters of fuel his household needs. According to the September 2026 WFP Market Monitor, food baskets remain 40 percent higher than September 2023 and the food consumer price index remains 94.1 percent higher than in September 2023. Meanwhile, unemployment sits at 81 percent, making earning nearly impossible.

D. Freedom of Movement & Return (D-1 to D-3)

1. No Forced Displacement Out of Gaza

Benchmark: *Point 12 of the plan states that "No one will be forced to leave Gaza." This indicator assesses whether people are being pushed to leave, including through confinement, conditions that make Gaza unlivable, and public calls by senior officials for emigration or expulsion.*

The vast majority of Gaza's population remains displaced, with no immediate prospect of return. Nearly the entire population is now confined to roughly 30 percent of Gaza, as nearly 70 percent of the territory—demarcated by the Yellow Line—remains under Israeli military control and largely off-limits to civilians. The Yellow Line effectively bisects large areas of Khan Younis, Rafah, Gaza City, and North Gaza, preventing families from returning to their homes or accessing private property.

Though forced displacement orders outside of Gaza have not occurred to date, several of the highest ranking Israeli government officials have announced that this should be the policy. Defense Minister Israel Katz said "there is no real solution for Gaza without emigration." National Security Minister Itamar Ben-Gvir unveiled a seven-year plan to move 1.86 million Gazans, nearly the entire population, out of the Strip. Eight Muslim-majority states condemned the emigration proposals as "a flagrant violation of the principles of international law", noting that the Trump plan itself includes a firm rejection of forced displacement.

2. Right to Movement & Civilian Access to Rebuild Gaza

Benchmark: *Point 12 of the plan states that those who wish to leave Gaza will be "free to do so and free to return," and Point 16 that "Israel will not occupy or annex Gaza." This indicator assesses whether Palestinians can move freely within Gaza and return to and rebuild their homes.*

Rather than preparing for withdrawal, the Israeli military has expanded and entrenched its presence. Satellite imagery shows significant infrastructure development, including paved bases, communications systems, and a physical barrier the military has confirmed now stretches more than 23 kilometers. The Yellow Line, presented in October 2025 as a temporary withdrawal line covering roughly 58 percent of Gaza, has moved in only one direction since. In May, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu told a conference that Israel controlled 60 percent of the territory and that "my directive is to move to... 70 per cent." The line now leaves nearly 70 percent of Gaza under Israeli control, and OCHA reports restrictions on access to 65 percent of Gaza's land, including the landfills near the perimeter. As a result, Gaza's 2.1 million people are now confined to roughly 30 percent of the territory they previously inhabited, an effective density of about 19,500 people per square kilometer, more than double the

pre-war average. That's the population density of Paris. Except instead of apartment blocks, functioning sewers and hospitals, people are living crammed amid nearly 70 million tons of rubble mixed with unexploded ordnance, asbestos, medical waste, and human remains, many of them in tents or damaged buildings.

Senior Israeli officials have made clear that this is not temporary. In September, Defense Minister Israel Katz said the military "will not withdraw from the Yellow Line in Gaza," and threatened that Gaza City would be dealt with "in the same way that Rafah and Beit Hanoun and 70 percent of the Gaza Strip were dealt with" if another Israeli were abducted.

Patterns of displacement have evolved from repeated cycles of flight to protracted confinement. More than 80 percent of the population remains displaced, and approximately 1.8 million people now live in 1,739 displacement sites, up from roughly 1 million people in 862 sites in November 2025. Most of these sites (82 percent) are makeshift. Some 45 percent of displaced households have been displaced seven times or more, and 69 percent have no concrete plan for where they will go next. Rather than enabling return, the advancing Yellow Line has become a driver of new displacement: families who resettled near the line after the ceasefire announcement have been forced to move again as it crept toward them.

One man from North Gaza, displaced 17 times during the war, told researchers he remained "still at risk of displacement because the Yellow Line keeps advancing." In July, tanks crossed the line and encircled a displacement site in northern Rafah. Within two days, yellow blocks had been repositioned 500 meters or more beyond the original line, leaving some 13,000 people at direct risk of forced displacement.

Services have all but vanished from these areas along the Yellow line. Aid organizations report being unable to operate within several kilometers of the line, and Israeli authorities require humanitarian movements to be coordinated across an additional "Orange Line" drawn further west into populated areas. "There are no services near the Yellow Line," one Gaza City resident said. "Wherever you look, assistance doesn't come." When expanding their presence, Israeli forces have unilaterally shifted the yellow blocks further west, razing areas, destroying hundreds of buildings, and displacing residents–actions that amount to violations of the ceasefire.

3. Medical Evacuations and Corridor

Israel committed under the plan to allow the evacuation of 50 critical patients a day. In the year since, WHO has facilitated the evacuation of 3,423 patients, an average of fewer than 10 per day. The pace has slowed further in recent weeks: between

September 29 and October 12, just 58 patients, including 11 children, were evacuated in three operations. Meanwhile, Gaza's health ministry says about 21,000 people urgently need treatment outside Gaza, including 5,600 children, 2,800 cancer patients, and 194 people with immediately life-threatening conditions. That is up from the 18,500 WHO reported in March.

The human toll of these delays is acute and ongoing. Physicians for Human Rights-Israel found that at least 1,570 patients died while awaiting evacuation between October 2023 and July 2026, including 264 children and 505 cancer patients. The health ministry now puts the figure at more than 2,000. Doctors working in Gaza describe children dying on the waiting list: one baby, born with a heart valve defect that needed surgery within 24 hours, waited months for evacuation and died of a fixable condition. Israel's defense ministry body COGAT maintains that it "facilitates medical evacuations without any limit on the number of patients." The numbers say otherwise.

Beyond emergency evacuations, the medical corridor that once allowed Palestinians from Gaza to access treatment for critical illnesses, including cancer and congenital heart problems, remains suspended. Israeli authorities continue to prohibit transfers of Gaza patients to hospitals in the West Bank and East Jerusalem, and in July Israel's Supreme Court declined to intervene. This leaves patients dependent on the limited willingness of third countries to receive them, despite the capacity, expertise, and infrastructure that exist in Palestinian hospitals just a few hours away.